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Extortion subdues human players but is
ﬁnally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma
Christian Hilbe1,2, Torsten Ro¨hl1 & Manfred Milinski3
Extortion is the practice of obtaining advantages through explicit forces and threats. Recently,
it was demonstrated that even the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, one of the key models to
explain mutual cooperation, allows for implicit forms of extortion. According to the theory,
extortioners demand and receive an excessive share of any surplus, which allows them to
outperform any adapting co-player. To explore the performance of such strategies against
humans, we have designed an economic experiment in which participants were matched
either with an extortioner or with a generous co-player. Although extortioners succeeded
against each of their human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity.
Human subjects showed a strong concern for fairness: they punished extortion by refusing to
fully cooperate, thereby reducing their own, and even more so, the extortioner’s gains. Thus,
the prospects of extorting others in social relationships seem limited; in the long run,
generosity is more proﬁtable.
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T
he repeated prisoner’s dilemma has a long tradition of
serving as a key model to explore the evolution of
cooperation1–6. The rules of this stylized game are
simple: in each round, two subjects simultaneously decide
whether to cooperate or to defect. When both subjects
cooperate they each receive a payoff R, which exceeds the
payoff P for mutual defection. However, when a cooperating
subject encounters a defector, the defector gets the highest
possible payoff T, whereas the cooperator obtains the lowest
payoff S. Although mutual defection is inefﬁcient, it is the unique
equilibrium if the prisoner’s dilemma is only played for a single
round. However, if subjects have the option to reciprocate past
actions in future encounters, a considerable body of evidence
suggests that mutual cooperation becomes feasible7–12, and that it
is in fact favoured by evolutionary forces13–18.
Recently, the conclusion that repetition naturally promotes
mutual cooperation has been challenged. With an elegant
mathematical proof, Press and Dyson19 have demonstrated that
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma also contains sophisticated
strategies that aim to dominate the co-player. Such extortionate
strategies have three remarkable properties: (i) they enforce a
linear relationship between the player’s own payoff and the
opponent’s payoff (strategies with this property were called zero-
determinant strategies or ZD strategies); (ii) they prescribe to
cooperate sufﬁciently often, such that the opponent’s best
response is to be fully cooperative; (iii) at the same time,
extortioners aim to cooperate less often than their opponent, to
gain higher payoffs. As a result, extortioners are unbeatable: in a
pairwise encounter, they cannot be outperformed by any
opponent. These surprising ﬁndings have attracted considerable
attention20, as they suggest that sophisticated players aware of
such strategies are able to manipulate and exploit their partners,
which should result in an evolutionary advantage.
Despite this relative strength, extortioners have problems to
succeed in evolving populations21–23. Extortion is unstable: as a
homogeneous population of extortioners ends up with the mutual
defection payoff P, more cooperative strategies can easily invade
and take over the population. Eventually, this dynamics may even
promote the emergence of generous ZD strategies, which may be
considered as the more benevolent counterpart to extortioners24.
Generous ZD strategies share the ﬁrst two properties of
extortioners: they enforce a linear relationship between the
payoffs of the two players, and they provide incentives for the
opponent to cooperate. However, as opppsed to extortioners who
aim to outcompete their opponents, the payoff of generous
players never exceeds the payoff of the co-player. Although
generous strategies seem to be too modest to succeed, they evolve
under a wide range of conditions25–27. Extortionate strategies, on
the other hand, require speciﬁc assumptions to be successful:
extortioners either need to be stubborn and to stick to their
strategy19, or they need to adopt new strategies at a slower rate
than their co-players21,28–30.
Although these previous theoretical studies offer a fascinating
new perspective on direct reciprocity and repeated games, they
raise great expectations for studying how the two strategy classes,
extortion and generosity, perform against real subjects. To this
end, we have designed an economic experiment with four
different treatments (see Table 1 and Methods). In each
treatment, human subjects played 60 rounds of the prisoner’s
dilemma against a predeﬁned computer programme (subjects did
not receive any information about the length of the game or the
nature of their opponent). The four treatments differed in the
implemented ZD strategy of the computer programme, which
was either strongly extortionate (ES), mildly extortionate (EM),
mildly generous (GM) or strongly generous (GS).
For all treatments, theory predicts that humans maximize their
expected payoff by cooperating in every round. In that case,
extortioners do not only outperform their human opponents, but
they are also expected to receive higher average payoffs than the
generous ZD strategies. In the experiment, however, we ﬁnd that
although extortionate strategies indeed dominate their human
co-players, this success comes at a cost. Humans are signiﬁcantly
less cooperative against extortioners. As a result, generosity is the
more proﬁtable strategy.
Results
Performance of ZD strategies against humans. Figure 1 shows
the resulting average payoffs over all 60 rounds of the game,
across the 4 treatments. These results conﬁrm that the two
extortionate ZD strategies indeed gain higher payoffs than their
human co-players. For example, in the strong extortion treat-
ment, the computer programme obtained an average payoff of
pES¼ h0.192 per round, whereas the human subjects earned on
average ~pES ¼ h0:128 (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test,
nES¼ 16 human co-players, Z¼ 3.523, Po0.001). Similarly, the
mildly extortionate ZD strategy received a payoff of pEM¼
h0.208, which clearly exceeds the mean payoff of the human
opponents, ~pEM ¼ h0:165 (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test, nEM¼ 14, Z¼ 3.181, P¼ 0.001).
Conversely, in the two generosity treatments human subjects
had the upper hand, as expected. In the mild generosity
treatment, the ZD strategy earned pGM¼ h0.235, as compared
with the human subjects’ mean payoff ~pGM ¼ h0:260 (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank test, nGM¼ 14, Z¼  2.527,
P¼ 0.012). Lastly, the strong generosity treatment resulted in
an average payoff of pGS¼ h0.237 for the ZD strategy and
~pGS ¼ h0:280 for the human co-players (Wilcoxon matched-pairs
Table 1 | Overview of the experimental design.
Treatment Number of human co-players Cooperation probabilities Slope
p0 pR pS pT pP s
ES 16 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.538 0.000 1/3
EM 14 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.786 0.000 2/3
GM 14 1.000 1.000 0.077 1.000 0.154 2/3
GS 16 1.000 1.000 0.182 1.000 0.364 1/3
ES, strong extortion; EM, mild extortion; GM, mild generosity; GS, strong generosity; ZD, zero determinant.
In each of the four treatments, the computer played according to a different ZD strategy. ZD strategies are deﬁned by ﬁve probabilities: p0 is the probability to cooperate in round m¼ 1, and for iA{R, S,
T, P} the value of pi is the probability to cooperate in round m41 after receiving the payoff i in round m 1, see refs 6,31. Extortionate strategies do not cooperate in the ﬁrst round, and they never
cooperate after mutual defection. Generous strategies, on the other hand, cooperate in the ﬁrst round and they always cooperate after mutual cooperation. For a derivation of the implemented
cooperation probabilities, we refer to the Supplementary Methods. The parameter s determines the slope of the predicted payoff relation: for example, a slope of s¼ 2/3 implies that for each Cent that
the ZD strategist earns additionally, the human co-player’s additional payoff is 2/3 Cents. In general, a smaller slope increases the payoff inequality between players: decreasing the value of s makes
extortionate ZD strategies even more extortionate, whereas it makes generous ZD strategies even more generous. For this experiment, we followed the parameters of ref. 3, that is, the payoffs were set to
T¼ h0.50, R¼ h0.30, P¼ h0.10 and S¼ h0.00.
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signed-rank test, nGS¼ 16, Z¼  2.521, P¼ 0.012). Thus, extor-
tionate strategies dominated their respective co-players, whereas
generous strategies let their co-players succeed. These results are
in line with the theory of ZD strategies, which in fact makes
virtually no assumptions about human play19. In addition, the
relationship between the payoffs of the ZD strategist and the
human co-player ﬁts reasonably to the linear prediction, as
illustrated by Fig. 2, despite the fact that the experimental game is
only played for a ﬁnite number of rounds (see Methods).
Comparison of the performance of different ZD strategies.
Surprisingly, however, both extortionate ZD strategies yielded a
lower payoff than their two generous counterparts. Indeed, when
we pool the two extortionate treatments and the two generous
treatments, we ﬁnd that generosity resulted in a 418% increase
in payoffs (Mann–Whitney U-test, nE¼ nG¼ 30, Z¼  2.544,
P¼ 0.011). Against an extortionate ZD strategy, the mean
cooperation rate of the human co-players was 34.2%, which is
only half of the cooperation rate against generous ZD strategies,
67.7% (Mann–Whitney U-test, nE¼ nG¼ 30, Z¼  3.625,
Po0.001). This gap comes unexpected, as the different ZD
strategies provide similar incentives for their human co-players to
cooperate (as indicated by the matching slope values in Table 1).
However, a comparison of the human decisions over the course of
the game suggests that the treatments followed a different
dynamical pattern (Fig. 3). Generous ZD strategies were more
successful in motivating their human co-players towards more
cooperation: in the two generous treatments, humans had a
cooperation rate of 53.0% during the ﬁrst ten rounds, as com-
pared with 76.0% during the last ten rounds (Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test, nG¼ 30, Z¼ 3.161, P¼ 0.002). In contrast,
when paired with an extortionate ZD strategy, the cooperation
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Figure 1 | Average payoffs across the four treatments for humans (empty
bars) and the ZD strategies implemented by the computer programme
(ﬁlled bars). In line with the theory, extortioners succeed against their
human co-players, whereas generous ZD strategies lag behind their human
opponents. Throughout the paper, we use two-tailed non-parametric tests
for our statistical analysis, with each iterated game between a human
co-player and the computer as our statistical unit (thus we have 16
independent observations for each of the 2 strong treatments, and 14
independent observations for each of the 2 weak treatments). In the above
graph, three stars indicate signiﬁcance at the level a¼0.001, and one star
means signiﬁcance for a¼0.05 (using Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank tests with nES¼ nGS¼ 16, nEM¼ nGM¼ 14). As an auxiliary information,
we also provide error bars indicating the 95% conﬁdence interval. Individual
results for all 60 individuals are presented in the Supplementary Table 1.

















































































Figure 2 | Comparison of experimental results to the theoretical prediction. The grey-shaded area depicts the space of possible payoffs for the two
players, that is, the ZD strategy implemented by the computer programme (x axis) and the human co-player (y axis). The black line corresponds
to the theoretical prediction for the expected payoffs (as explained in the Methods) and the open circles indicate the outcome of the experiment.
For the extortion treatments (a,b), these circles are below the diagonal (that is, extortioners outcompete their human co-players), whereas for the
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Figure 3 | Human cooperation rates over the course of the game. The
graph shows the fraction of cooperating human subjects for each round for
the two generosity treatments and the two extortion treatments. Dots
represent the outcome of the experiment, with the shaded areas depicting
the 95% conﬁdence interval. Both curves start with cooperation rates
around 30–40%. However, for the generous strategies we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
trend towards more cooperation, whereas for the extortionate strategies
the average cooperation rates remain stable.
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during the ﬁrst ten rounds to 39.7% during the last ten rounds
(this increase was not signiﬁcant, Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-rank test, nE¼ 30, Z¼ 1.131, P¼ 0.258).
These results suggest that humans were somewhat reluctant to
cooperate against extortioners. In fact, in the extortion treatments
o14% of the human co-players were fully cooperative during the
last ten rounds of the game, as compared with 463% in the
generosity treatments (see Supplementary Fig. 1). On the other
extreme, a third of the human subjects refused to cooperate
against an extortionate co-player during the last ten rounds of the
game, whereas only 1 out of 30 subjects did so in the generosity
treatments. Thus, although the different treatments provided
similar monetary incentives for cooperation, subjects were more
hesitant to cooperate against an extortionate co-player. With-
holding cooperation against these ZD strategies can be considered
as a form of costly punishment (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Fig. 2).
For example, reducing one’s cooperation rate by 10% against
strong extortioners decreased the opponent’s mean payoff per
round by h 0.029, but it also diminished the own payoff by
h 0.011. The resulting ﬁne-to-cost ratio for punishment,
0.029/0.011E2.6, is close to typical values used in experiments
on costly punishment32. Being less cooperative thus led to a
strong reduction in the co-player’s payoff, but it also turned out
to be costly for the punishing individual itself.
Discussion
Repeated games, and in particular the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, are model cases to explore the tension between
cooperation and conﬂict in long-term social relations33.
Although repetition was previously thought to promote
cooperation, it has recently been suggested that iterated games
may open the door for the systematic manipulation of
opponents19. The newly discovered ZD strategies are
surprisingly simple: they do not require to take the whole
history of the game into account—it is sufﬁcient to consider the
last round only. Although previous literature on ZD strategies has
focused on inﬁnitely repeated games, social relationships in
reality (and also our experiment) have a ﬁnite though fuzzy
horizon. However, as we show in the Methods, this does not
notably diminish the power of ZD strategies; if there is a sufﬁcient
number of rounds, ZD strategists have a similar amount of
control as in the inﬁnitely repeated game.
Two subclasses of ZD strategies have received particular
attention: extortioners, as they are able to outcompete their direct
opponents19, and generous ZD strategies, as they allow for stable
mutual cooperation25,26. Herein, we have investigated the
performance of these two strategy classes against human
subjects. Our results conﬁrm that extortioners dominated their
direct opponents, but unexpectedly generosity turned out to be
the more proﬁtable strategy. In a way, extortion meant to ‘win
each battle, but at the expense of losing the war’. These ﬁndings
are superﬁcially in line with previous evolutionary studies, which
suggested that natural selection in well-mixed populations
favours generous ZD strategies26,27. However, in these
theoretical studies the success of generosity was based on a
different argument; in an evolving population extortion does not
prevail because mutual extortion is unstable, which leads
extortioners to change their strategy21. In our experiment, the
strategy of the extortioners was ﬁxed, but extortioners were
unable to motivate their co-players to cooperate fully, despite
setting up appropriate incentives.
There are two possible explanations why humans were
reluctant to cooperate against extortioners. On the one hand,
subjects may have strived for high payoffs, but they did not have
enough time to learn that they need to fully cooperate to reach
this aim. This seems to be especially relevant as their opponents’
strategies were stochastic and thus not straightforward to predict.
However, this argument does not explain why generous ZD
players were more successful to catalyse cooperation than
extortioners—after all, the implemented ZD strategies were
equally complex and they provided comparable monetary
incentives to promote cooperation. Instead, our results suggest
that the subjects were not only driven by monetary considera-
tions, but that they were willing to apply reciprocal strategies to
oppose extortionate behaviours. In fact, several behavioural
studies have reported that a large fraction of humans can be
described as conditional cooperators34–36. In line with this
hypothesis, we ﬁnd that humans were almost four times more
likely to cooperate in a given round if their co-player did so in the
previous round (human cooperation rates were 81.1% if the
co-player cooperated in the previous round, and 22.0% otherwise,
see Supplementary Table 2). Reciprocal behaviours in turn can
have various behavioural roots, such as conformism, or the wish
to enforce fair outcomes37–39. In our generosity treatments the
two possible objectives, payoff-maximization and fairness, were
perfectly aligned; by maximizing their expected payoffs humans
also ensured equal outcomes. In contrast, in the extortion
treatments there was a trade-off; humans that aimed to maximize
their payoffs had to accept the most unfair outcome. As more
than half of the participants declared in the post-experiment
questionnaire that equality motives affected their decisions, the
wish to ensure fair outcomes may have been an important reason
for the downfall of extortion.
However, unlike in other strategic situations as in the
ultimatum game40, unfairness was not straightforward to detect
in our behavioural experiment. It is not a single selﬁsh decision
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Figure 4 | Withholding cooperation as a form of costly punishment. The
graph shows the effects of of human cooperation on the payoffs of ZD
strategies (a,b) and on the human subjects’ payoffs (c,d). The horizontal
axis shows the fraction of rounds in which the human players cooperated.
Coloured dots represent the outcome of the experiment, whereas the
dashed line depicts the linear regression curve based on a least squares
analysis. Human cooperation had a strongly positive impact on the
co-player’s payoff, and a weakly positive impact on the own payoff. Thus
withholding cooperation punishes extortion.
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that makes an opponent behaving extortionate. Rather, it is the
systematic interplay of selﬁshness and cooperation, which only
unfolds itself over the course of the game. At ﬁrst sight, the
extortionate strategies described by Press and Dyson19 look rather
inconspicuous (which may be one of the reasons why these
strategies were discovered only recently). Extortioners apply a
simple, conditionally cooperative strategy—with a slight bias to
their own advantage. Although this more implicit form of
selﬁshness seems to be more difﬁcult to detect, humans have
evolved mechanisms such as conditional cooperation that prevent
them from being exploited.
Although our experiment did not entail an explicit punishment
option, we found that by withholding contributions, subjects
applied an implicit form of costly punishment. Such an effect has
not been reported previously. In fact, it seems difﬁcult to show
such an effect with a conventional experiment, in which two
human subjects play against each other. One would have to
demonstrate that withholding cooperation is indeed individually
costly. However, this seems almost impossible, as long as the co-
player’s strategy is unknown (for example, against an uncondi-
tional defector, withholding cooperation is the best response and
hence no instance of costly punishment). Overall, our results thus
suggest that sufﬁcient monetary incentives alone are not enough
to induce cooperation in long-term social relationships. Instead,
humans take additional motives such as individual intentions and
fairness considerations into account, and they are ready to ﬁght
back when they feel exploited.
Methods
Experimental design. Experiments were conducted in November and December
2013 at the universities of Kiel and Hamburg, Germany, with subjects recruited
from a ﬁrst-year course in biology. All participants gave their informed consent to
participate. For each of ten experimental sessions, we invited six volunteers to
participate in a game. To ensure the subjects’ anonymity, participants were
separated by opaque partitions, they were playing under a neutral pseudonym and
they were not allowed to talk to each other during or after the experiment. All
experimental decisions were made on a computer screen using the experimental
software Z-Tree41. As we were interested in the relative performance of
extortionate and generous strategies, participants were not playing against each
other, but against a randomly determined computer strategy (out of the four
alternatives ES, EM, GM or GS, as outlined in Table 1). The subjects’ instructions
were kept in a neutral way, that is, subjects were neither told that they would
interact with a computer opponent nor that they would play against each other (see
Supplementary Methods for a translation of the experiment’s instructions). The
game consisted of 60 rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma (subjects were not informed
about the exact duration of the game, but rather that they would play over many
rounds). The experiment tookB1 h. Including the show-up fee of h 10, individual
earnings were on average between h 17.65 (in the strong extortion treatment) and
h 26.78 (in the strong generosity treatment).
Theoretical predictions. The extortionate and generous strategies used for the
experiment are instances of a more general strategy class, the class of ZD strategies.
In an inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, a ZD strategist can unilaterally
enforce a linear relation between his own payoff p and the co-player’s payoff ~p.
That is, payoffs obey a linear relation of the form19,21,25,26
 ~pþ spþð1 sÞl ¼ 0; ð1Þ
where l and s are characteristic properties of the applied ZD strategy27. The
baseline payoff l can be interpreted as the payoff of a ZD strategy against itself (for
the two extortionate strategies l¼ P, and for the two generous strategies l¼R). The
slope s determines how strongly the payoffs of the two players are correlated (for
the two mild treatments, we have used s¼ 2/3, corresponding to a rather high
correlation; for the two strong treatments, we have used s¼ 1/3). If the prisoner’s
dilemma is only repeated for a ﬁnite number of rounds M, equation (1) does not
need to be satisﬁed any longer. Nevertheless, one can derive the following estimate
for the players’ expected payoffs (see Supplementary Methods),
 p0
fM
  ~pþ spþð1 sÞl  1 p0
fM
; ð2Þ
where p0 is the probability that the ZD-strategist cooperates in the ﬁrst round and
f is a constant. In Fig. 2, the expected payoff range according to equation (2) is
depicted as a thin black area. See Supplementary Methods for further details.
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